Even though role-based access control (RBAC) can tremendously help us minimize the complexity in administering users, it is still needed to realize the notion of roles at the resource level. In this paper, we propose a practical cryptographic RBAC model, called role-key hierarchy model, to support various security features including signature and encryption based on role-key hierarchy. With the help of rich algebraic structure of elliptic curve, we introduce a rolebased cryptosystem construction to verify the rationality and validity of our proposed model. Also, a proof-of-concept prototype implementation and performance evaluation are discussed to demonstrate the feasibility and efficiency of our mechanisms.
INTRODUCTION
Role-based access control (RBAC), as a proven alternative to traditional access control including discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC), has been widely adopted for various information systems over * Supported by 863 Project of China (No.2006AA01Z434) and NSF of China (No. 10990011).
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. the past few years [11] . Even though RBAC can tremendously help us minimize the complexity in administering users, it is still needed to realize the notion of roles at the resource level. In other words, RBAC systems need to control a user's access to resources as well as resourcelevel management based on roles. Consequently, in order to provide effective resource management, it is inevitable to adopt various cryptographic capabilities for managing resources in RBAC systems. However, the existing cryptographic schemes have several limitations to address abovementioned features since those schemes cannot accommodate access control features of RBAC.
ASIACCS'10
In distributed environments, we can leverage RBAC models to enforce fine-grained policies for sharing resources [7] . However, the current cryptosystems do not support such shared modes because the encryption/decryption keys cannot be recognized between RBAC systems. As a consequence, the resources should be re-encrypted when they are transferred into another domain. Obviously, it is necessary to design an efficient cryptographic mechanism compatible with corresponding access control systems.
Some new technologies, such as identity-based encryption (IBE) [3] , attribute-based encryption (ABE) [8] , and publickey broadcast encryption (PBE) [5] lay out a solid foundation for designing an efficient cryptosystem. Inspired by these techniques, in this paper, we propose a practical cryptographic RBAC model, called role-key hierarchy model, to support a variety of security features including signature and encryption based on role-key hierarchy. With the help of rich algebraic structure of elliptic curve, we introduce a role-based cryptosystem construction to verify the rationality and validity of our proposed model. This constructions can provide more efficient and flexible control than other hierarchical key assignments [1] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the role hierarchy in RBAC and Section 3 articulates our role-key hierarchy structure and RBC construction. In Section 4, we address our application schemes for the proposed role-key hierarchy and RBC. In Section 5, we briefly evaluate the performance of our schemes followed by the conclusion with our future work.
PRELIMINARIES

Partial Orders
Let Ψ = ⟨ , ⪯⟩ be a (finite) partially ordered set with partial order relation ⪯ on a (finite) set . A partial order is a reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric binary relation. Inheritance is reflexive because a role inherits its own permissions, transitivity is a natural requirement in this context, and anti-symmetry rules out roles that inherit from one another and would therefore be redundant.
Two distinct elements and in Ψ are said to be comparable if ⪯ or ⪯ . Otherwise, they are , denoted by ∥ . An order relation ⪯ on gives rise to a relation ≺ of strict inequality:
≺ in if and only if (or iff) ⪯ and ∕ = . Also, if is dominated by , we denote the domination relation as ≺ . In addition, if ≺ and ⪯ ≺ , it then implies = . The latter condition demands that there be no element of satisfying ≺ ≺ . We define the predecessors and successors of elements in Ψ = ⟨ , ⪯⟩ as follows: For an element in , ↑ = { ∈ | ⪯ } denotes the set of predecessors of while ↓ = { ∈ | ⪯ } denotes the set of successors.
Role Hierarchy
In an information system, a hierarchy is used to denote the relationships and arrangements of the objects, users, elements, values, and so on. Especially, in many access control systems the users are organized in a hierarchy constructed with a number of classes, called security classes or roles, according to their competencies and responsibilities. This hierarchy arises from the fact that some users have more access rights than others.
In order to manage large-scale systems, the hierarchy in RBAC becomes more complex than other systems. Especially, role hierarchy (RH) is a natural means for structuring roles to reflect an organization's lines of authority and responsibility. We adopt the definitions from RBAC models proposed by Sandu et al. [10] :
The model has the following components:
• , , , and denote users, roles, permissions and sessions, respectively;
• ⊆ × , a many-to-many permission to role assignment relation;
• ⊆ × , a many-to-many user to role assignment relation;
• ⊆ × is a partial order on called the role hierarchy or role dominance relation, written as ⪯;
• : → , a function mapping each session to the single user ( ); and
→ 2 , a function mapping each session to a set of roles:
A hierarchy in RBAC is mathematically a partial order that defines an inheritance (or seniority) relation between roles, whereby senior roles acquire the permissions of their juniors. An example of role hierarchy is shown in Figure 1 , in which more powerful (senior) roles are shown toward the top of the diagram and less powerful (junior) roles toward the bottom. Based on the specific features of resource management, we divide role hierarchy into three categories:
1. Tree hierarchy: It is useful to support the sharing of resources, in which resources make available to junior roles are also available to senior roles.
2. Inverted-tree hierarchy: It allows the aggregation of resources from more than one role, in which the senior can access resources in all subordinate roles.
3. General hierarchy: It can compose various different structures into a role hierarchy. Thus it facilitates both the sharing and aggregation of resources.
ROLE KEY HIERARCHY
Role-Key Hierarchy Structure
In order to incorporate cryptographic schemes with RBAC, we propose a new hierarchy structure called Role-Key Hierarchy (RKH). Based on the hierarchical RBAC model, we define RKH as follows:
[Role-Key Hierarchy]: Given a role hierarchy ⟨ , ⪯⟩ in RBAC, role-key hierarchy is a cryptographic partial order relation for the sets of users, keys, and roles, denoted by ℋ = ⟨ , , , ⪯⟩, satisfying the following conditions:
1.
= ∪ , the key set includes the role-key set and the user-key set ;
2.
⊆ × , a one-to-many user to key assignment relation, i.e., each user , ∈ is assigned to an exclusive user-key , ∈ ; 
3.
⊆ × , a one-to-one role to key assignment relation, i.e., each role ∈ corresponds to a unique role-key ∈ ;
4. ⊆ × , is a partial order on called the key hierarchy or key dominance relation, also written as ⪯; and 5. Each user , can access the resources associated with if and only if ⪯ ∈ and ( , , ) ∈ .
where, ⟨ , ⪯⟩ is the smallest partially ordered set satisfying the above conditions. The user holds multiple user keys if he is a member of multiple roles in role hierarchy.
In RBAC systems, various access control functions are designated by permissions . In the same way, the RBAC permissions can be designated by some cryptographical algorithms, such as and , which can realize various access control functions by using role keys and user keys in role-key hierarchy. These algorithms can also be used independently to protect files from unauthorized access while these resources break away from the scope of this RBAC systems or an attacker gains physical access to the computer.
Figure 2: Example of role-key hierarchy
Our main objective is to map the role hierarchy in RBAC into a key management system. According to the condition 3 and 4, the role key set should have the same structure as the role hierarchy structure. Moreover, each user key , ∈ also needs to contain necessary information about role hierarchy for dealing with access functions independently by itself. Figure 2 shows an example of role-key hierarchy, in which the circle denotes the role key and the triangle denotes the user key, respectively. Note that this is a general hierarchy.
Role-based Cryptosystem
For ease of use, we expect that a system manager assigns the user key , = ( , , , ) to a user, where , is a public label and , is a private key. This label , can be used to realize special functions such as designation, revocation, and tracing. Given a role hierarchy Ψ = ⟨ , ⪯⟩ and a security parameter , Role-based Cryptosystem (RBC) is a key management system that can construct a role-key hierarchy ℋ = ⟨ , , , ⪯⟩ on Ψ and generate all keys on ℋ, which is specified by three randomized algorithms, , , and , described as follows:
• Setup( , Ψ): Takes a security parameter and a role hierarchy Ψ as an input. It produces a manager key and an initial parameter , that is,
• GenRKey( , ): Takes the parameter and a role index . It generates a role key in , that is, ( , ) → .
• AddUser( , , , ): Takes a user identity , a user index , , and the manager key . It outputs a user secret key, which involves a user label , and a private key , , for the user , , that is,
, is added to the public encryption key:
In public-key settings, a user does not hold any private information and the permission process is performed only with the help of the public role key { } containing the user's labels { , }, which is also called as ID-based RBC because the user's public labels can be used to support the various functions.
Security Goal of RKH
Obviously, security requirements in general cryptosystem are not sufficient enough to reflect the requirements of rolekey hierarchy. It is important to consider typical attacks when we try to design key hierarchy and its schemes. In contrast with existing key hierarchy, RKH has several unique features:
1. Each user , is assigned to an exclusive user key , , by which certain users can be chosen or identified in the processes of encryption, revocation, and tracing; 2. Public-key cryptography can be introduced to ensure the security of a user's private key even if the role key makes public in some systems. Therefore the role keys can be stored anywhere by RBAC systems; and 3. The derivation function of a user's private key is forbidden even for the cases of partial order relations,
where, is small enough. Hence a user cannot use this capability to obtain new keys or identities.
In order to ensure system security, RKH also needs to satisfy following properties:
• Each user in a role cannot get permissions to access another role's objects except for its subordinates, Also, a user cannot forge other's secret keys;
• The role key can be modified to satisfy the requirements of constraint policy, but it should not interfere with the issued keys of others; and
• To support the capability of audit capability, there exists an efficient tracing algorithm to identify the corrupted users or gain the corresponding evidence.
The RKH is a group-oriented cryptography with "1:n" character, where one role key corresponds to many user keys. Hence, in addition to passive cryptanalysis, the collusion attack is a major attack, which focuses on changing the privilege of the granted users or getting the other users' keys. This kind of attack involves the following cases:
• Collusion attack for framing users, in which the corrupted users in ℛ = { , } =1 wish to forge a new or unused key in ∖ ℛ (called as honest user). The aim of this attack is to avoid tracing and frame innocent users.
• Collusion attack for role's privilege, in which the corrupted users in = { , } =1 wish to forge a new or unused key in ∖{ 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , }. The aim of this attack is to change the privilege in partial order hierarchy.
It is a challenging task to avoid collusion attack since the traitors (corrupted users) have been granted users before they are detected. Traitor tracing is an efficient method to tackle this attack. However, we must ensure that the traitors cannot forge an 'unused' key to avoid tracing but leave some 'foregone' clue of evidence to discover them.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY MECH-ANISMS BASED ON RKH
In this section, we present our role-based cryptosystem scheme with role-key hierarchy based on pairing-based cryptosystem. Also, applicable cryptographic mechanisms are proposed to demonstrate the feasibility and efficiency of our model and mechanisms.
Bilinear Pairings
We set up our systems using bilinear pairings proposed by Boneh and Franklin [2, 4] . Let 1, 2 and be three cyclic groups of large prime order . 1 and 2 are two additive groups and is a multiplicative group using elliptic curve conventions. Letˆ be a computable bilinear map : 1 × 2 → 2 with the following properties: For any ∈ 1, ∈ 2 and all , ∈ ℤ , we have
Bilinearity: ([ ] , [ ] ) = ( , ) .
2. Non-degeneracy: ( , ) ∕ = 1 unless or = 1.
Computability: ( , ) is efficiently computable.
Where, [ ] denotes the multiplication of a point in elliptic curve by a scalar ∈ ℤ . A bilinear map group system is a tuple = ⟨ , 1, 2, , ⟩ composed of the objects as described above. may also include group generators in its description.
Role-based Cryptosystem Scheme
Let ℋ = { , , , ⪯} is a role-key hierarchy with partialorder ⪯. Without loss of generality, we assume that the total number of roles is in ℋ, i.e., = { 1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , }. We construct our RBC scheme as follows:
, ) be a bilinear map group system with randomly selected generators ∈ 1 and ∈ 2, where 1 and 2 be bilinear group of prime order . This algorithm first picks a random integer ∈ ℤ * for each role in role-key hierarchy graph. We define
Each is called as the secret of a role and is the identity of a role. Further, it defines 0 = [ 0] by using a random 0 ∈ ℤ * . Thus, public parameter is
and we keep = ⟨ , 0, 1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ⟩ secret. 2 We require that no efficient isomorphism 2 → 1 or 1 → • ( , ): This is an assignment algorithm for role encryption key from the setup parameter . For a role , the role key can be computed as follows:
where, { } ∈↑ is the set of all roles in ↑ , which denotes the control domain for the role . It is clear that =
, so that we have = [ ] .
• ( , , , ): Given = ⟨ , { } =0 ⟩ and a user index , in the role , the manager generates a unique decryption key by randomly selecting a fresh , = ℎ( , , ) ∈ ℤ * and defining , = ⟨ , , , ⟩ where
Finally, the above process outputs the set of role keys { } and the set of user keys { , }. More importantly, the security of user keys is not compromised even though role keys are available in public. Let us now turn to the problem of validity. We know that two arbitrary roles have one of three relations:
⪯ , ⪯ , and || , so that partial order relation in role keys can be defined as
where, ( ) and ( ) denote the set of incomparable roles and successors for , respectively. This is illustrated in Figure 3 (the top is senior-most roles and the bottom is junior-most roles), with the key representation of on the left of the node and on the right.
Role-based Signature
The signature is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of a digital message or document. In RBAC model, the roles assigned to a user can be considered as one kind of identities of the user. Hence, a user could use his own roles to sign a resource. In other words, such a signature scheme provides a method to allow a user to anonymously sign a message on behalf of his roles. We call it Role-based Signature (RBS). The formal definition of RBS is provided as follows:
Definition 3 (Role-based Signature). A role-based signature scheme is a digital signature consisted of the following four procedures:
Initial: Takes role hierarchy ⟨ , ⪯⟩, and returns the rolekey hierarchy ℋ = ⟨ , , , ⪯⟩ according to Setup and GenRKey algorithms in RBC model;
Sign: Takes the role-key for , a user key , , and a message ∈ {0, 1} * , and returns a signature : ( , , , ) → ; Verify: Takes the role-key and a purported signature on a message . It returns the validation result which would be either valid or invalid. The latter response can mean either that is not a valid signature, or that the user who generated has been revoked (in a set of revoked users, RL):
Trace: Takes a user key , then this algorithm can trace a signature to at least one role member , who generated it:
The trace algorithm allows a third party to undo the signature anonymity using a special trapdoor and recognize the original signer. A secure role-based signature scheme must satisfy following properties:
• Correctness: This requires that, for all = ( , ) generated by role-key hierarchy, valid signatures by role members can always be verified correctly, and invalid signatures should fail in the verification phase:
• Unforgeability: Only members of a role can create valid signatures with the role.
• Anonymity: Given a message and its signature, the identity of the individual signer cannot be determined without the manager key .
• Traceability: Given any valid signature, the manager or trusted third party should be able to trace who issued the signature by the user's secret key.
• Unlinkability: Given two messages and their signatures, we cannot determine whether the signatures were from the same signer or not.
In autonomous systems, role-based signature is used to verify the legality of the source of input data transmitted from other hosts or devices. This is more important for information sharing systems to prevent harmful information flows.
Role-based Encryption
Encryption systems allow users to encrypt resources (files or data) on disk, or synchronously transfer messages among multiple systems. Many encryption file systems have been developed in Windows and Linux environments, e.g., Windows Encrypting File System (EFS), SiRiUS [6] and Plutus [9] . However, these systems implement some trivial schemes where the number of ciphertexts in the file header grows linearly with the increased number of users who have permissions to access the file. To overcome such a limitation, we introduce a new scheme called Role-based Encryption (RBE), which can be used to improve the performance of existing encryption file systems.
Definition 4 (Role-based Encryption).
A role-based encryption scheme is an encryption system consisting of the following three procedures:
Initial: Takes role hierarchy ⟨ , ⪯⟩, and returns the rolekey hierarchy ℋ = ⟨ , , , ⪯⟩ according to Setup and GenKey algorithms in RHC model;
Encrypt: Takes the encryption key and a plaintext . It produces a ciphertext :
( , ) → .
Decrypt: Takes the user key , and the ciphertext . It generates the plaintext :
The relationship between encryption and decryption can be described as follows:
where ⪯ and ( , , ) ∈ .
Role-based encryption not only presents a solution for secure resource sharing across large-scale network, but also improves interoperation between different types of platforms. In addition, we believe it can also provide following security features:
• Protection against data leakage on the physical device, possibly caused by an untrusted administrator, a stolen laptop or a compromised server;
• Detection and prevention of unauthorized data modifications using a syncretic security mechanism based on policy-based access control and dynamic cryptographic technology;
• Changing users' access privileges by dynamically converging the information of users' decryption keys to generate one-time role-based encryption keys; and
• Enabling better scalability because all users are organized into a uniformed role-based cryptographic framework. Most of cryptographic operations are performed at role level rather than at user level.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
An experimental role-based cryptosystem was implemented to test the feasibility of our schemes. This system was developed with a standard C++ language in QT environment, which supports cross-platform deployment. As shown in Figure 4 , this system consists of three modules: RBC module, access control module and application module. In RBC module, we adopted GNU multiple precision arithmetic library (GMP) to handle integers of arbitrary precision. Then, a finite fields arithmetic library was constructed to realize the run-time environment of elliptic curve and pairing-based cryptosystems. In addition, a cryptographic access control library was developed based on the finite fields arithmetic library to realize various proposed RBC algorithms. Finally, the RBE/RBA/RBS algorithms worked with a lightweight access control module to provide encryption, authentication 3 and key-label management services for the application module.
The experimental results show our constructions are able to provide better scalability, which is an important requirement for RBAC [10] . The notion of scalability is multidimensional. In our schemes we can achieve scalability with respect to the number of roles, the size of role hierarchy, cardinality on user-role assignments, and so on. Moreover, our constructions support a large-size of role hierarchy with arbitrary structures. Therefore, we believe our schemes can be applied to large-scale role-based cryptosystems, such as healthcare and financial systems. total number of users 100-1,000 1,000-10,000 10,000-100,000
We can consider several degrees to measure the scalability of our method as follows: 1) small scale (10's), 2) medium scale (100's), and 3) large scale (1000's). We estimate different parameters under different scales shown in Table 1 , in which we assume that the size of relations is proportional to the size of roles.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed a role-key hierarchy structure along with hierarchical RBAC model to accommodate the require-
